Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin

被引:87
作者
Fujiwara, Thomas [1 ,2 ]
Wantchekon, Leonard [3 ]
机构
[1] Princeton Univ, Dept Econ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Princeton Univ, Dept Polit, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
关键词
AFRICA; DEMOCRACY;
D O I
10.1257/app.5.4.241
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper studies the electoral effects of town hall meetings based on programmatic, nonclientelist platforms. The experiment involves the cooperation of leading candidates in a presidential election in Benin. A campaign strategy based solely on these meetings was assigned to randomly selected villages and compared to the standard strategy of clientelist rallies. We find that treatment reduces the prevalence of clientelism and does not affect turnout. Treatment also lowers the vote shares for the candidate with a political stronghold in the village and is more effective in garnering votes in regions where a candidate does not have a political stronghold.
引用
收藏
页码:241 / 255
页数:15
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