Price discrimination and investment incentives

被引：14

作者：

Alexandrov, Alexei ^{[1
]}

Deb, Joyee ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] NYU, New York, NY 10003 USA

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 2012年 / 30卷 / 06期

关键词：

price discrimination; investment; parallel trade; pharmaceuticals; net neutrality; INPUT MARKETS; WELFARE; OUTPUT; GOODS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.07.001

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We examine a model of a monopolist selling to two segments of consumers with different preferences for quality. We show that if the firm is unable to price discriminate between the segments, then there is less investment in quality. We find that both consumer segments, and society overall, may suffer if the firm is unable to price discriminate. We extend the model to duopoly competition, and find that our results still hold. Published by Elsevier B.V.

引用

页码：615 / 623

页数：9

共 21 条

[1] Monopoly Price Discrimination and Demand Curvature [J].