The effects of seed money and refunds on charitable giving: Experimental evidence from a university capital campaign

被引:250
作者
List, JA [1 ]
Lucking-Reiley, D
机构
[1] Univ Maryland, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
[2] Univ Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1086/324392
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We design a field experiment to test two theories of fund-raising for threshold public goods: Andreoni predicts that publicly announced "seed money" will increase charitable donations, whereas Bagnoli and Lipman predict a similar increase for a refund policy. Experimentally manipulating a solicitation of 3,000 households for a university capital campaign produced data confirming both predictions. Increasing seed money from 10 percent to 67 percent of the campaign goal produced a nearly sixfold increase in contributions, with significant effects on both participation rates and average gift size. Imposing a refund increased contributions by a more modest 20 percent, with significant effects on average gift size.
引用
收藏
页码:215 / 233
页数:19
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