Chaos in learning a simple two-person game

被引:129
作者
Sato, Y
Akiyama, E
Farmer, JD
机构
[1] RIKEN, Inst Phys & Chem Res, Brain Sci Inst, Wako, Saitama 3510198, Japan
[2] Univ Tsukuba, Inst Policy & Planning Sci, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 3058573, Japan
[3] Santa Fe Inst, Santa Fe, NM 87501 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1073/pnas.032086299
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
We investigate the problem of learning to play the game of rock-paper-scissors. Each player attempts to improve her/his average score by adjusting the frequency of the three possible responses, using reinforcement learning. For the zero sum game the learning process displays Hamiltonian chaos. Thus, the learning trajectory can be simple or complex, depending on initial conditions. We also investigate the non-zero sum case and show that it can give rise to chaotic transients. This is, to our knowledge, the first demonstration of Hamiltonian chaos in learning a basic two-person game, extending earlier findings of chaotic attractors in dissipative systems. As we argue here, chaos provides an important self-consistency condition for determining when players will learn to behave as though they were fully rational. That chaos can occur in learning a simple game indicates one should use caution in assuming real people will learn to play a game according to a Nash equilibrium strategy.
引用
收藏
页码:4748 / 4751
页数:4
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