Costly voting

被引：119

作者：

Börgers, T ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UCL, Dept Econ, London WC1E 6BT, England

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2004年 / 94卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/000282804322970706

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

What are good voting rules if voting is costly? We analyze this question for the case that an electorate chooses among two alternatives. In a symmetric private value model of voting we show that majority voting with voluntary participation Paretodominates majority voting with compulsory participation as well as random decision-making.

引用

页码：57 / 66

页数：10

共 18 条

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