Systemic risk, reinsurance, and the failure of crop insurance markets

被引:195
作者
Miranda, MJ [1 ]
Glauber, JW [1 ]
机构
[1] USDA,OFF ECON,WASHINGTON,DC 20250
关键词
crop insurance; systemic risk; market failure;
D O I
10.2307/1243954
中图分类号
F3 [农业经济];
学科分类号
0202 ; 020205 ; 1203 ;
摘要
Without affordable reinsurance, private crop insurance markets are doomed to fail because systemic weather effects induce high correlation among farm-level yields, defeating insurer efforts to pool risks across farms. Using an empirical model of the U.S. crop insurance market, we find that U.S. crop insurer portfolios are twenty to fifty times riskier than they would be otherwise if yields were stochastically independent across farms, We also find that area yield reinsurance contracts would enable crop insurers to cover most of their systemic crop loss risk, reducing their risk exposure to levels typically experienced by more conventional property liability insurers.
引用
收藏
页码:206 / 215
页数:10
相关论文
共 21 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], EC AGR CROP INSURANC
[2]  
Berliner B., 1982, Limits of Insurability of Risks
[3]   INSURABILITY AND MORAL HAZARD IN AGRICULTURAL INSURANCE MARKETS [J].
CHAMBERS, RG .
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, 1989, 71 (03) :604-616
[4]  
FACKLER PL, 1993, QUANTIFYING LONG RUN
[5]  
*FED CROP INS CORP, 1994, BLUEPR FIN SOUNDN
[6]   COMMODITY OPTIONS FOR AGRICULTURE [J].
GARDNER, BL .
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, 1977, 59 (05) :986-992
[7]  
GLAUBER JW, 1993, USDA EC RES SERVICE, V686
[8]  
GOODWIN BK, 1995, EC CROP INS DISASTER
[9]   THEORY OF THE FIRM WITH JOINT PRICE AND OUTPUT RISK AND A FORWARD MARKET [J].
GRANT, D .
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, 1985, 67 (03) :630-635
[10]  
GRENCHIK M, 1995, UNPUB CHICAGO BOARD