Inside the black box: The role and composition of compensation peer groups

被引：231

作者：

Faulkender, Michael ^{[1
]}

Yang, Jun ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Maryland, RH Smith Sch Business, College Pk, MD 20742 USA

[2] Indiana Univ, Kelley Sch Business, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2010年 / 96卷 / 02期

关键词：

Executive compensation; Peer groups; Benchmarking; CEO COMPENSATION; PAY; INCENTIVES; COMMITTEE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.01.006

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper considers the features of the newly disclosed compensation peer groups and demonstrates their significant role in explaining variations in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation beyond that of other benchmarks such as the industry-size peers. After controlling for industry, size, visibility, CEO responsibility, and talent flows, we find that firms appear to select highly paid peers to justify their CEO compensation and this effect is stronger in firms where the compensation peer group is smaller, where the CEO is the chairman of the board of directors, where the CEO has longer tenure, and where directors are busier serving on multiple boards. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：257 / 270

页数：14

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