How category reporting can improve fundraising

被引:7
作者
Cartwright, Edward [1 ]
Patel, Amrish [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Kent, Dept Econ, Canterbury CT2 7NP, Kent, England
[2] Univ Gothenburg, Dept Econ, SE-40530 Gothenburg, Sweden
关键词
Category reporting; Esteem; Fundraising; Signalling; PUBLIC-GOODS; IMAGE MOTIVATION; SOCIAL IMAGE; INCENTIVES; ANONYMITY; BEHAVIOR; PRESTIGE; CHOICE; CAPS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jebo.2013.01.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Many fundraisers report donations using categories such as more than 1000, more than 10,000, etc. One naturally wonders how we should categorise donations and whether categorising raises more than simple uncategorised reporting. To answer these questions, we employ a signalling game framework in which both the donor's donation and his benefits of being in a higher category are determined endogenously. We find that categorised reporting can always improve fundraising. Both high and low category thresholds can increase donations, with prior beliefs determining which is better. While categorising can lead to the existence of a low donation equilibrium, it is less problematic if signalling benefits are low. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:73 / 90
页数:18
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