The newsvendor game has a nonempty core

被引：71

作者：

Muller, A

Scarsini, M

Shaked, M

机构：

[1] Univ Karlsruhe, Inst Wirtschaftstheorie & Operat Res, D-76128 Karlsruhe, Germany

[2] Univ G DAnnunzio, Dipartimento Sci, I-65127 Pescara, Italy

[3] Univ Arizona, Dept Math, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2002年 / 38卷 / 01期

关键词：

cost allocation; inventory centralization; core;

D O I：

10.1006/game.2001.0854

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We settle an open conjecture regarding the newsvendor game. We prove that its core is always nonempty for all possible joint distributions of the random demands. We give sufficient conditions under which the core is a singleton, or at a core allocation every newsvendor shares a nonnegative cost. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science.

引用

页码：118 / 126

页数：9

共 12 条

[1]

[Anonymous], J OPERATIONS MANAGEM

[2]

Bondareva O.N., 1963, PROBL KIBERN, V10, P119

[3] EFFECTS OF CENTRALIZATION ON EXPECTED COSTS IN A MULTI-LOCATION NEWSBOY PROBLEM [J].