Trust in political-administrative relations: The case of local authorities in Norway and Tanzania

被引:15
作者
Jacobsen, DI [1 ]
机构
[1] Agder Coll, Kristiansand, Norway
关键词
D O I
10.1016/S0305-750X(99)00032-7
中图分类号
F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
is often assumed, but seldom empirically tested, that trust in politicians and political institutions is lower in newer than in more established democracies. This paper assesses empirically to what extent administrators at the local level trust politicians and political institutions. A comparative study, including an established democracy (Norway) and a newly democratized country (Tanzania) concludes that there is a "trust deficit" in the new democracy. The study further presents data that support the notion that administrators who do not trust political institutions suppress views, i.e. hide information, in the preparatory phase of political decisions. Administrators who have little trust in political institutions also engage in more discussions with politicians when making difficult delegated decisions. This suggests that trust is a substitute for imperfect information and that administrators who trust politicians and political institutions are more willing to take risks. The effect of trust on political loyalty is not significant when implementing political decisions. The paper argues that lack of trust may decrease efficiency, and that it may represent barriers to political governance. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:839 / 853
页数:15
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