SOCIAL NORMS AND WELFARE STATE DYNAMICS

被引：34

作者：

Lindbeck, Assar ^{[1
]}

Nyberg, Sten ^{[2
]}

Weibull, Joergen W. ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Stockholm Univ, Inst Int Econ Studies, Stockholm, Sweden

[2] Stockholm Univ, Stockholm, Sweden

[3] Boston Univ, Boston, MA 02215 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION | 2003年 / 1卷 / 2-3期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1162/154247603322391170

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The paper analyses the interaction between economic incentives and work norms in the context of social insurance. If the work norm is endogenous in the sense that it is weaker when the population share of beneficiaries is higher, then voters will choose less generous benefits than otherwise. We also discuss welfare-state dynamics when there is a time lag in the adjustment of the norm in response to changes in this population share, and show how a temporary shift in the unemployment rate may cause persistence in the number of beneficiaries. (JEL: Z13, D19, D64, H31)

引用

页码：533 / 542

页数：10

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