Strategic Information Management Under Leakage in a Supply Chain

被引:238
作者
Anand, Krishnan S. [1 ]
Goyal, Manu [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
[2] Univ Maryland, Robert H Smith Sch Business, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
关键词
application contexts/sectors; supply chain and logistics; competitive impacts of IS; economics of IS; manufacturing; strategy; COST INFORMATION; EQUILIBRIUM; ACQUISITION; COURNOT; COMPETITION; KNOWLEDGE; OLIGOPOLY; EXCHANGE;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.1080.0930
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
The importance of material. flow management for a profit-maximizing. firm has been well articulated in the supply chain literature. We demonstrate in our analytical model that a. firm must also actively manage information. flows within the supply chain, which translates to controlling what it knows, as well as what its competitors and suppliers know. In our model of horizontal competition between an informed and an uninformed. firm with a common upstream supplier, material and information. flows intersect through leakage of demand (order) information to unintended recipients. As a result, the informed. firm's drive to control information. flows within the supply chain can trigger operational losses through material. flow distortion. These losses can be so severe that the. firm may prefer not to acquire information even when it is costless to do so. Our results underscore the importance of strategic information management-actively managing the supply chain's information. flows, and making trade-offs with material. flows where appropriate, to maximize profits.
引用
收藏
页码:438 / 452
页数:15
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