Bonded labor and serfdom: a paradox of voluntary choice

被引:35
作者
Genicot, G [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Irvine, Dept Econ, Irvine, CA 92697 USA
关键词
implicit contract; bonded labor; interlinkage; credit; coercion;
D O I
10.1016/S0304-3878(01)00179-1
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Among the oldest and most pervasive economic institutions are bonded labor and serfdom. While seemingly exploitative, both bonded labor and serfdom are often not imposed on the laborers but voluntarily chosen. It is generally the lack of suitable alternatives which makes workers opt for a life in servitude. This paper shows that the existence of these voluntary forms of servitude itself may restrain the laborers' opportunities so that they are left with no better alternative than bondage. Under these circumstances, government interventions banning servile institutions, by promoting the development of alternative options for the laborers, have the potential to substantially improve the condition of a large class of laborers. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:101 / 127
页数:27
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