Behavioural science - Homo reciprocans

被引:82
作者
Bowles, S [1 ]
Gintis, H
机构
[1] Santa Fe Inst, Santa Fe, NM 87501 USA
[2] Univ Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1038/415125a
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Humans are often generous, but cooperation unravels when others take advantage of them. Many people punish such 'free riders', even if they do not benefit personally, and this 'altruistic punishment' sustains cooperation.
引用
收藏
页码:125 / +
页数:3
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