Advanced Demand Side Management for the Future Smart Grid Using Mechanism Design

被引:612
作者
Samadi, Pedram [1 ]
Mohsenian-Rad, Hamed [2 ]
Schober, Robert [1 ]
Wong, Vincent W. S. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ British Columbia, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada
[2] Texas Tech Univ, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Lubbock, TX 79409 USA
基金
加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;
关键词
Demand side management; energy consumption control; smart grid; VCG mechanism design; RESOURCE-ALLOCATION; LOAD CONTROL; EFFICIENCY; GAME;
D O I
10.1109/TSG.2012.2203341
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
In the future smart grid, both users and power companies can potentially benefit from the economical and environmental advantages of smart pricing methods to more effectively reflect the fluctuations of the wholesale price into the customer side. In addition, smart pricing can be used to seek social benefits and to implement social objectives. To achieve social objectives, the utility company may need to collect various information about users and their energy consumption behavior, which can be challenging. In this paper, we propose an efficient pricing method to tackle this problem. We assume that each user is equipped with an energy consumption controller (ECC) as part of its smart meter. All smart meters are connected to not only the power grid but also a communication infrastructure. This allows two-way communication among smart meters and the utility company. We analytically model each user's preferences and energy consumption patterns in form of a utility function. Based on this model, we propose a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism which aims to maximize the social welfare, i.e., the aggregate utility functions of all users minus the total energy cost. Our design requires that each user provides some information about its energy demand. In return, the energy provider will determine each user's electricity bill payment. Finally, we verify some important properties of our proposed VCG mechanism for demand side management such as efficiency, user truthfulness, and nonnegative transfer. Simulation results confirm that the proposed pricing method can benefit both users and utility companies.
引用
收藏
页码:1170 / 1180
页数:11
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