Economics of antipoaching enforcement and the ivory trade ban

被引:57
作者
Bulte, EH [1 ]
van Kooten, GC
机构
[1] Tilburg Univ, Dept Econ, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
[2] Agr Univ Wageningen, Dept Econ & Management, Wageningen, Netherlands
[3] Univ British Columbia, Fac Agr, Vancouver, BC V5Z 1M9, Canada
[4] Univ British Columbia, Fac Forestry, Vancouver, BC V5Z 1M9, Canada
关键词
dynamic optimization; elephants; ivory trade ban; poaching enforcement;
D O I
10.2307/1244594
中图分类号
F3 [农业经济];
学科分类号
0202 ; 020205 ; 1203 ;
摘要
A model of elephant conservation that includes illegal poaching, enforcement effort, and legal culling is used to analyze enforcement and elephant populations for alternative policies, with and without legal trade in ivory. Consistent with previous theoretical models, banning trade may increase or decrease equilibrium stocks. As an empirical application, information for Zambia, along with sensitivity analysis, are used to show that the ivory trade ban is more effective in conserving the African elephant (Loxodonta africana) than in permitting open trade. However, in all situations, current elephant populations likely exceed optimal levels as perceived by the range states, and further reductions in elephant numbers might be expected.
引用
收藏
页码:453 / 466
页数:14
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