Development aid and international politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions?

被引:273
作者
Dreher, Axel [1 ]
Sturm, Jan-Egbert [1 ]
Vreeland, James Raymond [2 ]
机构
[1] ETH, KOF Swiss Econ Inst, CH-8092 Zurich, Switzerland
[2] Yale Univ, Dept Polit Sci, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
关键词
World Bank; UN Security Council; Voting; Aid; GROWTH; IMF; DETERMINANTS; LOGIC; POWER;
D O I
10.1016/j.jdeveco.2008.02.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We investigate whether elected members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the World Bank, using panel data for 157 countries over the period 1970-2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary UN Security Council membership and the number of World Bank projects a country receives, even after accounting for economic and political factors, as well as regional, country and year effects. The size of World Bank loans, however, is not affected by UN Security Council membership. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 18
页数:18
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