Tradeable carbon permit auctions - How and why to auction not grandfather

被引:240
作者
Cramton, P
Kerr, S
机构
[1] Motu Econ & Publ Policy Res, Wellington, New Zealand
[2] Univ Maryland, Dept Econ, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
tradeable carbon permits; grandfathering; climate change; auctions;
D O I
10.1016/S0301-4215(01)00100-8
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
An auction of carbon permits is the best way to achieve domestic carbon caps designed to limit global climate change. To minimize administrative costs, permits would be required at the level of oil refineries, natural gas pipe lines, natural gas liquid sellers. and coal processing plants. To maximize liquidity in secondary markets. permits would be fully tradable and bank-able. The government would conduct quarterly auctions. A standard ascending-clock auction in which price is gradually raised until there is no excess demand would provide reliable price discovery. An auction is preferred to grandfathering (giving companies permits based on historical output or emissions), because it allows reduced tax distortions, provides more flexibility in distribution of costs, provides greater incentives for innovation. and reduces the need for politically contentious arguments over the allocation of rents. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:333 / 345
页数:13
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