Block ownership and firm-specific information

被引:145
作者
Brockman, Paul [1 ]
Yan, Xuemin [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Missouri, Robert J Trulaske Sr Coll Business, Dept Finance, Columbia, MO 65211 USA
关键词
Block ownership; Probability of informed trading; Idiosyncratic volatility; AGENCY COSTS; STOCK; INDUSTRY; MARKETS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2008.08.011
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study examines the impact of block ownership on the firm's information environment. Previous research shows that stock price efficiency depends on the cost of acquiring private information, as well as on the precision of this information. Blockholders have a clear advantage over diffuse, atomistic shareholders in terms of the precision and acquisition cost of their private information. We hypothesize that this informational advantage will manifest itself primarily in the firm-specific component of stock returns. Our empirical findings confirm that blockholders increase the probability of informed trading and idiosyncratic volatility, and decrease the firm's stock return synchronicity. These results hold for both inside and outside blockholders, but are insignificant for blocks controlled by employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs). Overall, our findings support the contention that ownership structure plays a significant role in shaping the firm's information environment. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:308 / 316
页数:9
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