Patents or prizes: Monopolistic R&D and asymmetric information

被引：12

作者：

deLaat, EAA

机构：

[1] Tinbergen Institute, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 3000 DR Rotterdam

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 1997年 / 15卷 / 03期

关键词：

patents; research prizes; asymmetric information; R&D regulation;

D O I：

10.1016/0167-7187(95)00491-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper a model of R&D regulation is analysed to compare the effect of two types of asymmetric information on the welfare properties of patents and prizes as R&D incentive instruments when there is a technological leader. Using the case of fun information as a benchmark, it is found that the trade-off between patents and prizes does not change if the innovator's R&D costs are private information, whereas the relative efficiency of patents decreases if the government is less informed about the market for the innovation.

引用

页码：369 / 390

页数：22

共 19 条

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[2]

Arrow KJ., 1962, RATE DIRECTION INVEN, P609, DOI [DOI 10.1521/IJGP.2006.56.2.191, 10.1515/9781400879762-024]

[3] REGULATING A MONOPOLIST WITH UNKNOWN COSTS [J].