Fictitious play property for games with identical interests

被引：250

作者：

Monderer, D

Shapley, LS

机构：

[1] UNIV CALIF LOS ANGELES,DEPT ECON,LOS ANGELES,CA 90024

[2] UNIV CALIF LOS ANGELES,DEPT MATH,LOS ANGELES,CA 90024

[3] QUEENS UNIV,DEPT ECON,KINGSTON,ON K7L 3N6,CANADA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1996年 / 68卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.1996.0014

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

An n-person game has identical interests if it is best response equivalent in mixed strategies to a game with identical payoff functions, It is proved that every such game has the fictitious play property. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.

引用

页码：258 / 265

页数：8

共 12 条

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