Are Analysts' Forecasts Informative to the General Public?

被引:62
作者
Altinkilic, Oya [1 ]
Balashov, Vadim S. [2 ]
Hansen, Robert S. [3 ]
机构
[1] George Washington Univ, Sch Business, Washington, DC 20052 USA
[2] Rutgers State Univ, Sch Business Camden, Camden, NJ 08102 USA
[3] Tulane Univ, AB Freeman Sch Business, New Orleans, LA 70118 USA
关键词
analysts' forecasts; financial analysts; financial markets; investment banking; market efficiency; security analysts; MARKET-EFFICIENCY; EARNINGS; INVESTMENT; RECOMMENDATIONS; RETURNS; ILLIQUIDITY; DISCLOSURE; REPUTATION; REVISIONS; ACCURACY;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.2013.1721
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Contrary to the common view that analysts are important information agents, intraday returns evidence shows that announcements of analysts' forecast revisions release little new information, on average. Further cross-sectional evidence from returns around the announcements confirms that revisions are virtually information free. Daily announcement returns used in the literature appear to overstate the analyst's role as information agent, because forecast announcements are often issued directly after reports of significant news about the followed firm. The evidence reveals a sequential relationship between events and news and forecast revisions indicative of analyst piggybacking, not prophecy. These new findings about the most sought-after analyst reports broaden significantly the evidence indicating that price reactions to analysts' reports reveal little new information.
引用
收藏
页码:2550 / 2565
页数:16
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