What matchings can be stable? The testable implications of matching theory

被引：62

作者：

Echenique, Federico ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] CALTECH, Div Humanities & Social Sci, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA

来源：

MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH | 2008年 / 33卷 / 03期

关键词：

stable matchings; revealed preference; inverse optimization;

D O I：

10.1287/moor.1080.0318

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

This paper studies the falsi. ability of two-sided matching theory when agents' preferences are unknown. A collection of matchings is rationalizable if there are preferences for the agents involved so that the matchings are stable. We show that there are nonrationalizable collections of matchings; hence, the theory is falsi. able. We also characterize the rationalizable collections of matchings, which leads to a test of matching theory in the spirit of revealed-preference tests of individual optimizing behavior.

引用

页码：757 / 768

页数：12

共 22 条

[1]

Afriat S.N., 1967, Int. Econ. Rev., V8, P67, DOI [/10.2307/2525382, DOI 10.2307/2525382]

[2] EVERY FINITE DISTRIBUTIVE LATTICE IS A SET OF STABLE MATCHINGS [J].

BLAIR, C .

JOURNAL OF COMBINATORIAL THEORY SERIES A, 1984, 37 (03) :353-356

[3] Uniqueness, stability, and comparative statics in rationalizable Walrasian markets [J].

Brown, DJ ;

Shannon, C .

ECONOMETRICA, 2000, 68 (06) :1529-1539

[4] Testable restrictions on the equilibrium manifold [J].

Brown, DJ ;

Matzkin, RL .

ECONOMETRICA, 1996, 64 (06) :1249-1262

[5]

Denes J., 1974, LATIN SQUARES THEIR

[6]

ECHENIQUE F, 2006, 1252 CALTECH SSWP

[7]

Echenique F., 2006, THEOR ECON, V1, P233

[8] Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems [J].

Ehlers, Lars .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2007, 134 (01) :537-547

[9]

ERDOS P, 1946, AM J MATH, V68, P230

[10] COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND STABILITY OF MARRIAGE [J].

GALE, D ;

SHAPLEY, LS .

AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL MONTHLY, 1962, 69 (01) :9-&

← 1 2 3 →