Water markets and third-party effects

被引：14

作者：

Bourgeon, Jean-Marc ^{[1
,2
]}

Easter, K. William ^{[3
]}

Smith, Rodney B. W. ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] INRA, Palaiseau, France

[2] Ecole Polytech, Palaiseau, France

[3] Univ Minnesota, Dept Appl Econ, St Paul, MN 55108 USA

来源：

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS | 2008年 / 90卷 / 04期

关键词：

job market frictions; regional economics; resource economics; third-party effects; water markets;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1467-8276.2008.01146.x

中图分类号：

F3 [农业经济];

学科分类号：

0202 ; 020205 ; 1203 ;

摘要：

We examine potential third-party effects arising from trading water from one region (rural) to another (urban). Using labor, water and heterogeneous land, rural agents produce a traded agricultural good and nontraded service good. Absent job market frictions, increased water trading improves per capita regional welfare, but aggregate service income can increase (decrease) while individual land rents decrease (increase). If labor experiences job market frictions, water trading can trigger socially inefficient land fallowing. and a decrease in per capita regional welfare. Simulation results confirm the no-job-market-friction model predictions.

引用

页码：902 / 917

页数：16

共 17 条

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