Private employers don't need formal risk adjustment

被引:16
作者
Glazer, J
McGuire, TG
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Med, Dept Hlth Care Policy, Boston, MA 02115 USA
[2] Tel Aviv Univ, Fac Management, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel
关键词
D O I
10.5034/inquiryjrnl_38.3.260
中图分类号
R19 [保健组织与事业(卫生事业管理)];
学科分类号
摘要
This paper lays down a set of hypotheses to explain why private employers do not use formal risk adjustment. The theme running through these hypotheses is simple: private employers don't need formal adjustment because they have better tools for dealing with adverse selection than formal risk adjustment provides. Open enrollment provisions, premium negotiations, and restricting employees' choices of health plans are mechanisms superior to formal risk adjustment for dealing with problems caused by adverse selection.
引用
收藏
页码:260 / 269
页数:10
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