On the optimal number of representatives

被引：18

作者：

Auriol, Emmanuelle ^{[2
,3
]}

Gary-Bobo, Robert J. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] ENSAE, CREST, F-92245 Malakoff, France

[2] Toulouse Sch Econ, IDEI, F-31000 Toulouse, France

[3] Toulouse Sch Econ, ARQADE, F-31000 Toulouse, France

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 2012年 / 153卷 / 3-4期

关键词：

Representative democracy; Number of representatives; Constitution design; Incentives; INFORMATION ACQUISITION; LEGISLATURES; COMPETITION; CORRUPTION;

D O I：

10.1007/s11127-011-9801-3

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We propose a normative theory of the number of representatives based on a model of a representative democracy. We derive a formula giving the number of representatives as proportional to the square root of total population. Simple tests of the formula on a sample of a 100 countries yield good results. We then discuss the appropriateness of the number of representatives in some countries. It seems that the United States has too few representatives, while France and Italy have too many. The excess number of representatives matters: it is positively correlated with indicators of red tape and barriers to entrepreneurship.

引用

页码：419 / 445

页数：27