Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted: a reconsideration under asymmetric information

被引:33
作者
Raymond, M [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Guelph, Dept Econ, Guelph, ON N1G 2W1, Canada
关键词
enforcement; asymmetric information;
D O I
10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00106-6
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Hanington (Harrington, W., 1988. Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted. Journal of Public Economics 37, 29-53) offers an explanation for how relatively high compliance rates might co-exist with low expected fines. His results are highly dependent on the assumptions that all firms are identical and their compliance costs are known. This paper shows that Hanington's results are not necessarily robust in a more general model where asymmetric information and uncertainty are present. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A, All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:289 / 295
页数:7
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