Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case

被引:23
作者
Fang, HM
Parreiras, SO
机构
[1] Yale Univ, Dept Econ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
[2] Univ N Carolina, Dept Econ, Chapel Hill, NC 27599 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1006/game.2001.0896
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study affiliated value second price auctions with two financially constrained bidders. We prove the existence of a symmetric equilibrium under quite general conditions. Comparative static results are provided. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
引用
收藏
页码:215 / 236
页数:22
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