The Persistence of Inferior Cultural-Institutional Conventions

被引：29

作者：

Belloc, Marianna ^{[1
]}

Bowles, Samuel ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Roma La Sapienza, I-00161 Rome, Italy

[2] Santa Fe Inst, Santa Fe, NM 87501 USA

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/aer.103.3.93

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：93 / 98

页数：6

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