Equilibrium selection and consistency

被引：30

作者：

Norde, H

Potters, J

Reijnierse, H

Vermeulen, D

机构：

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1996年 / 12卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/game.1996.0014

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper we show that, for two important classes of strategic games, namely the class of mixed extensions of finite games and the class of games with compact and convex strategy spaces and continuous-concave payoff functions, equilibrium selection is incompatible with One Person Rationality, Consistency and (restricted) Non-Emptiness. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.

引用

页码：219 / 225

页数：7

共 15 条

[1]

Aumann R. J., 1959, ANN MATH STUD, V40, P287

[2] COALITION-PROOF NASH EQUILIBRIA .1. CONCEPTS [J].

BERNHEIM, BD ;

PELEG, B ;

WHINSTON, MD .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1987, 42 (01) :1-12

[3] A FURTHER GENERALIZATION OF THE KAKUTANI FIXED POINT THEOREM, WITH APPLICATION TO NASH EQUILIBRIUM POINTS [J].

GLICKSBERG, IL .

PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL SOCIETY, 1952, 3 (01) :170-174

[4]

Harsanyi J. C., 1973, International Journal of Game Theory, V2, P235, DOI 10.1007/BF01737572

[5]

Harsanyi J. C., 1973, International Journal of Game Theory, V2, P1, DOI 10.1007/BF01737554

[6]

HARSANYI JC, 1982, GENERAL THEORY EQUIL

[7]

Kalai E., 1984, International Journal of Game Theory, V13, P129, DOI 10.1007/BF01769811

[8] ON THE STRATEGIC STABILITY OF EQUILIBRIA [J].

KOHLBERG, E ;

MERTENS, JF .

ECONOMETRICA, 1986, 54 (05) :1003-1037

[9]

Myerson RB, 1978, INT J GAME THEORY, V7, P73, DOI DOI 10.1007/BF01753236

[10]

NASH J, 1951, ANN MATH, V54, P286, DOI 10.2307/1969529

← 1 2 →