Toward a synthesis of models of regulatory policy design with limited information

被引:18
作者
Armstrong, M
Sappington, DEM
机构
[1] UCL, Dept Econ, London WC1E 6BT, England
[2] Univ Florida, Dept Econ, Gainesville, FL 32611 USA
关键词
regulation; asymmetric information;
D O I
10.1023/B:REGE.0000028011.71612.70
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We develop a simple, yet general, model that admits as special cases several key analyses of the design of regulatory policy in the presence of asymmetric information. In doing so, we help to identify the central differences and similarities among the diverse analyses in the literature.
引用
收藏
页码:5 / 21
页数:17
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