On the organization of cooperative research and development: Theory and evidence

被引:26
作者
Tao, ZG
Wu, CQ
机构
关键词
incomplete contracts; organizations of cooperative R and D; research joint ventures; co-development;
D O I
10.1016/S0167-7187(96)01052-1
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
It has become increasingly prevalent that business firms, often rival firms, join forces in cooperative R and D to develop new technologies that they can use in their downstream business. Equity research joint ventures and non-equity co-development are the two major modes of organization, and they differ in how ownership rights over newly developed technologies are assigned. This paper addresses the question of when cooperative R and D should be carried out in a research joint venture as opposed to a co-development program. In a setting of contractual incompleteness, the nature of the downstream business of participating firms is shown to determine the organization of cooperative R and D. Empirical evidence that is consistent with the theoretical analysis is also presented. (C) 1997 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:573 / 596
页数:24
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