HEALTH-CARE PAYMENT SYSTEMS: COST AND QUALITY INCENTIVES-REPLY

被引：10

作者：

Ma, Ching-to Albert ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Boston Univ, Dept Econ, Boston, MA 02215 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY | 1998年 / 7卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00139.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

I reconsider the implementation of efficient cost and quality efforts when health-care providers may refuse services to consumers, and introduce a mechanism that is a combination of prospective payment and cost reimbursement. Conditions are derived for the prospective payment level and the margin above cost reimbursement for the implementation of efficient efforts.

引用

页码：139 / 142

页数：4