Large-scale quarantine following biological terrorism in the United States - Scientific examination, logistic and legal limits, and possible consequences

被引:113
作者
Barbera, J
Macintyre, A
Gostin, L
Inglesby, T
O'Toole, T
DeAtley, C
Tonat, K
Layton, M
机构
[1] George Washington Univ, Med Ctr, Inst Crisis & Disaster Management, Washington, DC 20037 USA
[2] George Washington Univ, Med Ctr, Dept Emergency Med, Washington, DC 20037 USA
[3] Johns Hopkins Univ, Ctr Civilian Biodef, Baltimore, MD USA
[4] Georgetown Univ, Ctr Law & Publ Hlth, Washington, DC 20057 USA
[5] Dept Hlth & Human Serv, Off Emergency Preparedness, Rockville, MD USA
[6] Dept Publ Hlth, New York, NY USA
来源
JAMA-JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION | 2001年 / 286卷 / 21期
关键词
D O I
10.1001/jama.286.21.2711
中图分类号
R5 [内科学];
学科分类号
1002 ; 100201 ;
摘要
Concern for potential bioterrorist attacks causing mass casualties has increased recently. Particular attention has been paid to scenarios in which a biological agent capable of person-to-person transmission, such as smallpox, is intentionally released among civilians. Multiple public health interventions are possible to effect disease containment in this context. One disease control measure that has been regularly proposed in various settings is the imposition of large-scale or geographic quarantine on the potentially exposed population. Although large-scale quarantine has not been implemented in recent US history, it has been used on a small scale in biological hoaxes, and it has been invoked in federally sponsored bioterrorism exercises. This article reviews the scientific principles that are relevant to the likely effectiveness of quarantine, the logistic barriers to its implementation, legal issues that a large-scale quarantine raises, and possible adverse consequences that might result from quarantine action. Imposition of large-scale quarantine-compulsory sequestration of groups of possibly exposed persons or human confinement within certain geographic areas to prevent spread of contagious disease-should not be considered a primary public health strategy in most imaginable circumstances. In the majority of contexts, other less extreme public health actions are likely to be more effective and create fewer unintended adverse consequences than quarantine. Actions and areas for future research, policy development, and response planning efforts are provided.
引用
收藏
页码:2711 / 2717
页数:7
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