Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments

被引:306
作者
Bochet, O
Page, T
Putterman, L
机构
[1] Brown Univ, Dept Econ, Providence, RI 02912 USA
[2] Maastricht Univ, Maastricht, Netherlands
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
public goods; collective action; communication; punishment; cheap talk;
D O I
10.1016/j.jebo.2003.06.006
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We compare three forms of communication and punishment as incentives to increase contributions to public goods in laboratory experiments. We find, as in earlier experiments, that face-to-face communication has very strong effects, but surprisingly that verbal communication through a chat room preserving anonymity and excluding facial expression, etc. was almost as efficient. Numerical communication, via computer terminals, had no net effect on contributions or efficiency. Punishment, as in earlier experiments, increased contributions but because of its cost had little net effect on efficiency. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:11 / 26
页数:16
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