The greenhouse development rights framework for global burden sharing: reflection on principles and prospects

被引:36
作者
Baer, Paul [1 ]
机构
[1] Georgia Inst Technol, Sch Publ Policy, Atlanta, GA 30332 USA
关键词
CLIMATE-CHANGE; EMISSIONS; POLICY;
D O I
10.1002/wcc.201
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
The Greenhouse Development Rights (GDRs) Framework is a proposal for a global climate agreement in which the obligations assigned to nations are based on a combination of responsibility (contribution to the problem) and capacity (ability to pay). A key feature of the GDRs framework is that it is modeled on the assignment of a right to development to individuals, such that individuals with incomes below a development threshold are nominally exempted from obligations to pay for mitigation and adaptation. Obligations for those over the threshold are calculated in the same way for rich persons in poor countries and rich persons in rich countries. As income distribution within countries is taken into account and all countries have some wealthy people, all countries have a positive obligation to contribute to global mitigation and adaptation requirements, eliminating the sharp distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I countries. In the last few years, GDRs has become one of the most widely known of the many so-called burden-sharing frameworks that have been proposed. In this essay, one of the co-authors of the GDRs framework presents the framework's fundamental principles, describes its place in the larger discussion of burden-sharing and climate justice, and reflects on its prospects in the next phase of the global climate negotiations. Hopefully it will be helpful both to readers new to GDRs and to our existing supporters and critics. WIREs Clim Change 2013, 4:6171. doi: 10.1002/wcc.201 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.
引用
收藏
页码:61 / 71
页数:11
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Aldy J.E., 2007, Architectures for Agreement
  • [2] Aldy J.E., 2003, KYOTO ADV INT EFFORT
  • [3] Alliance of Small Island States, 2009, DECL CLIM CHANG 2009
  • [4] [Anonymous], SOLV CLIM DIL BUDG A
  • [5] [Anonymous], 1998, EQUITY GLOBAL CLIMAT
  • [6] [Anonymous], 2014, CHEM INT NEWSMAGAZIN, V32, P14, DOI [10.1515/ci.2010.32.1.14, DOI 10.1515/CI.2010.32.1.14]
  • [7] [Anonymous], 2001, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation
  • [8] [Anonymous], 2008, Atmospheric justice: A political theory of climate change
  • [9] [Anonymous], 2011, EQ ACC SUST DEV CONT
  • [10] Baer P, 2009, GREENHOUSE DEV RIGHT, P147