How does financing impact investment? The role of debt covenants

被引:940
作者
Chava, Sudheer [1 ]
Roberts, Michael R. [2 ]
机构
[1] Texas A&M Univ, Mays Business Sch, College Stn, TX 77843 USA
[2] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01391.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We identify a specific channel (debt covenants) and the corresponding mechanism (transfer of control rights) through which financing frictions impact corporate investment. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that capital investment declines sharply following a financial covenant violation, when creditors use the threat of accelerating the loan to intervene in management. Further, the reduction in investment is concentrated in situations in which agency and information problems are relatively more severe, highlighting how the state-contingent allocation of control rights can help mitigate investment distortions arising from financing frictions.
引用
收藏
页码:2085 / 2121
页数:37
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