Raising Retailers' Profits: On Vertical Practices and the Exclusion of Rivals

被引：64

作者：

Asker, John ^{[1
]}

Bar-Isaac, Heski ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] NYU Stern, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10012 USA

[2] Univ Toronto, Rotman Sch Management, Toronto, ON M5S 3E6, Canada

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2014年 / 104卷 / 02期

关键词：

RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE; DEMAND UNCERTAINTY; RESTRAINTS; ENTRY; POWER;

D O I：

10.1257/aer.104.2.672

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Resale price maintenance (RPM), slotting fees, loyalty rebates, and other related vertical practices can allow an incumbent manufacturer to transfer profits to retailers. If these retailers were to accommodate entry, upstream competition could lead to lower industry profits and the breakdown of these profit transfers. Thus, in equilibrium, retailers can internalize the effect of accommodating entry on the incumbent's profits. Consequently, if entry requires downstream accommodation, entry can be deterred. We discuss policy implications of this aspect of vertical contracting practices. (JEL L14, L22, L25, L42, L81)

引用

页码：672 / 686

页数：15

共 43 条

[1] Exclusive dealing with imperfect downstream competition [J].