Cooperation in social dilemmas, trust and reciprocity

被引：52

作者：

Chaudhuri, A

Sopher, B

Strand, P

机构：

[1] Wellesley Coll, Dept Econ, Wellesley, MA 02481 USA

[2] Washington State Univ, Dept Econ, Richland, WA 99352 USA

[3] Rutgers State Univ, Dept Econ, New Brunswick, NJ 08901 USA

[4] Washington State Univ, Dept Psychol, Richland, WA 99352 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY | 2002年 / 23卷 / 02期

关键词：

repeated play prisoner's dilemma; cooperation; trust; reciprocity;

D O I：

10.1016/S0167-4870(02)00065-X

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The present study attempts to connect cooperative behavior in the repeated play prisoner's dilemma (RPPD) with "trusting" and "reciprocal" behavior. Our goal is to see if people with different propensities to cooperate exhibit differing degrees of trust and reciprocity, We find the subjects who choose to cooperate in a RPPD game exhibit higher levels of trust. However when it comes to reciprocal behavior, cooperating subjects do not behave differently than subjects who choose to defect. (C) 2002 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.

引用

页码：231 / 249

页数：19

共 29 条

[1] The moonlighting game - An experimental study on reciprocity and retribution [J].