PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS

被引：26

作者：

Liu, Qihong ^{[1
]}

Serfes, Konstantinos ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Oklahoma, Dept Econ, Norman, OK 73019 USA

[2] Drexel Univ, Dept Econ & Int Business, Bennett S LeBow Coll Business, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY | 2013年 / 22卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We examine the profitability and welfare implications of targeted price discrimination (PD) in two-sided markets. First, we show that equilibrium discriminatory prices exhibit novel features relative to discriminatory prices in one-sided models and uniform prices in two-sided models. Second, we compare the profitability of perfect PD, relative to uniform prices in a two-sided market. The conventional wisdom from one-sided horizontally differentiated markets is that PD hurts the firms and benefits consumers, prisoners' dilemma. We show that PD, in a two-sided market, may actually soften the competition. Our results suggest that the conventional advice that PD is good for competition based on one-sided markets may not carry over to two-sided markets.

引用

页数：19