Redistribution, taxes, and the median voter

被引：24

作者：

Bassetto, M

Benhabib, J

机构：

[1] NYU, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10003 USA

[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[3] Univ Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA

[4] Fed Reserve Bank Chicago, Chicago, IL 60604 USA

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS | 2006年 / 9卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

redistribution; median voter; capital income taxes; Gorman aggregation;

D O I：

10.1016/j.red.2006.02.001

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study a simple model of production, accumulation, and redistribution, where agents are heterogeneous in their initial wealth, and a sequence of redistributive tax rates is voted upon. Though the policy is infinite-dimensional, we prove that a median voter theorem holds if households have identical, Gorman aggregable preferences; furthermore, the tax policy preferred by the median voter has the "bang-bang" property. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：211 / 223

页数：13

共 13 条

[1]

Atkeson A., 1999, Quarterly Review Sum, P3

[2] Equilibrium and government commitment [J].