Why regulate insider trading? Evidence from the first great merger wave (1897-1903)

被引：33

作者：

Banerjee, A ^{[1
]}

Eckard, EW ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Colorado, Coll Business, Denver, CO 80217 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2001年 / 91卷 / 05期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/aer.91.5.1329

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We use event-time methodology to study legal insider trading associated with mergers circa 1900. For mergers with "prospective" disclosures similar to today's, we find substantial value gains at announcement, implying participation by "outside" shareholders despite the absence of insider constraints. Furthermore, preannouncement stock-price runups, relative to total value gain, are no more than those observed for modern mergers. Insider regulation apparently has produced little benefit for outsiders, with the inside information-pricing function and related gains shifting to external "information specialists." Other results suggest market penalties for nondisclosure; i.e., insider trading is less successful in a restricted information environment.

引用

页码：1329 / 1349

页数：21

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