Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan

被引:825
作者
Caballero, Ricardo J. [1 ,2 ]
Hoshi, Takeo [2 ,3 ,4 ]
Kashyap, Anil K. [2 ,5 ,6 ]
机构
[1] MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Univ Calif San Diego, Sch Int Relat & Pacific Studies, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA
[4] Tokyo Ctr Econ Res, Tokyo, Japan
[5] Univ Chicago, Grad Sch Business, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
[6] Fed Reserve Bank Chicago, Chicago, IL USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/aer.98.5.1943
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Large Japanese banks often engaged in sham loan restructurings that kept credit flowing to otherwise insolvent borrowers (which we call zombies). We examine the implications of suppressing the normal competitive process whereby the zombies would shed workers and lose market share. The congestion created by the zombies reduces the profits for healthy firms, which discourages their entry and investment. We confirm that zombie-dominated industries exhibit more depressed job creation and destruction, and lower productivity. We present firm-level regressions showing that the increase in zombies depressed the investment and employment growth of non-zombies and widened the productivity gap between zombies and non-zombies.
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页码:1943 / 1977
页数:35
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