A signaling framework to deter aggression in cyberspace

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union constantly maneuvered to achieve superiority. When one nation was perceived to overstep its bounds, the other would signal its discontent by moving aircraft carrier groups, conducting military exercises, pursuing diplomatic actions or enforcing embargoes. These clear, but nuanced, signals may well have averted nuclear exchanges. The speed of the Internet coupled with its global connectivity and inextricable links to critical infrastructure assets render signaling just as important in cyberspace, especially as nation states and other actors are investing in cyber operations capabilities. This paper presents a flexible and intuitive framework for adversary-defender interactions involving ensembles of adversary stimuli and defender signals. Scenarios involving cyber operations on the electric power grid are used to clarify the signaling goals and corresponding "plays" executed by a defender in response to adversary actions. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.