Do IRS Audits Deter Corporate Tax Avoidance?

被引:298
作者
Hoopes, Jeffrey L. [1 ]
Mescall, Devan [2 ]
Pittman, Jeffrey A. [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
[2] Univ Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK S7N 0W0, Canada
[3] Mem Univ Newfoundland, St John, NF A1C 5S7, Canada
关键词
tax enforcement; tax compliance; IRS audits; taxes; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; EARNINGS; FIRMS; INCOME; AGGRESSIVENESS; GOVERNANCE; MANAGEMENT; ECONOMICS; SHELTERS; LOCATION;
D O I
10.2308/accr-50187
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We extend research on the determinants of corporate tax avoidance to include the role of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) monitoring. Our evidence from large samples implies that U.S. public firms undertake less aggressive tax positions when tax enforcement is stricter. Reflecting its first-order economic impact on firms, our coefficient estimates imply that raising the probability of an IRS audit from 19 percent (the 25th percentile in our data) to 37 percent (the 75th percentile) increases their cash effective tax rates, on average, by nearly two percentage points, which amounts to a 7 percent increase in cash effective tax rates. These results are robust to controlling for firm size and time, which determine our primary proxy for IRS enforcement, in different ways; specifying several alternative dependent and test variables; and confronting potential endogeneity with instrumental variables and panel data estimations, among other techniques.
引用
收藏
页码:1603 / 1639
页数:37
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