The Organization of Firms Across Countries

被引:296
作者
Bloom, Nicholas
Sadun, Raffaella
Van Reenen, John [1 ]
机构
[1] London Sch Econ, CEP, London WC2A 2AE, England
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION; INFORMATION-TECHNOLOGY; MANAGEMENT-PRACTICES; ASSET OWNERSHIP; FLATTENING FIRM; TRADE; AUTHORITY; CULTURE; REALLOCATION; INSTITUTIONS;
D O I
10.1093/qje/qje029
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We argue that social capital as proxied by trust increases aggregate productivity by affecting the organization of firms. To do this we collect new data on the decentralization of investment, hiring, production, and sales decisions from corporate headquarters to local plant managers in almost 4,000 firms in the United States, Europe, and Asia. We find that firms headquartered in high-trust regions are significantly more likely to decentralize. To help identify causal effects, we look within multinational firms and show that higher levels of bilateral trust between the multinational's country of origin and subsidiary's country of location increases decentralization, even after instrumenting trust using religious similarities between the countries. Finally, we show evidence suggesting that trust raises aggregate productivity by facilitating reallocation between firms and allowing more efficient firms to grow, as CEOs can decentralize more decisions.
引用
收藏
页码:1663 / 1705
页数:43
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