机构:
Univ Calif Los Angeles, Anderson Sch Management, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USAUniv Calif Los Angeles, Anderson Sch Management, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
Ederer, Florian
[1
]
Manso, Gustavo
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Calif Berkeley, Haas Sch Business, Berkeley, CA 94720 USAUniv Calif Los Angeles, Anderson Sch Management, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
Manso, Gustavo
[2
]
机构:
[1] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Anderson Sch Management, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
[2] Univ Calif Berkeley, Haas Sch Business, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
organizational studies;
motivation incentives;
personnel;
research and development;
innovation;
SILICON VALLEY;
PIECE RATES;
INCENTIVES;
WORK;
RECIPROCITY;
MOBILITY;
D O I:
10.1287/mnsc.1120.1683
中图分类号:
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号:
12 ;
1201 ;
1202 ;
120202 ;
摘要:
Previous research in economics shows that compensation based on the pay-for-performance principle is effective in inducing higher levels of effort and productivity. On the other hand, research in psychology argues that performance-based financial incentives inhibit creativity and innovation. How should managerial compensation be structured if the goal is to induce managers to pursue more innovative business strategies? In a controlled laboratory setting, we provide evidence that the combination of tolerance for early failure and reward for long-term success is effective in motivating innovation. Subjects under such an incentive scheme explore more and are more likely to discover a novel business strategy than subjects under fixed-wage and standard pay-for-performance incentive schemes. We also find evidence that the threat of termination can undermine incentives for innovation, whereas golden parachutes can alleviate these innovation-reducing effects.