Groups Make Better Self-Interested Decisions

被引:214
作者
Charness, Gary [1 ]
Sutter, Matthias [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Dept Econ, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA
[2] Univ Innsbruck, Dept Publ Finance, A-6020 Innsbruck, Austria
[3] Univ Gothenburg, Dept Econ, Gothenburg, Sweden
关键词
CONJUNCTION FALLACY; INDIVIDUALS; BEHAVIOR; TEAM; HEADS; TRUST; GAME;
D O I
10.1257/jep.26.3.157
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In this paper, we describe what economists have learned about differences between group and individual decision-making. This literature is still young, and in this paper, we will mostly draw on experimental work (mainly in the laboratory) that has compared individual decision-making to group decision-making, and to individual decision-making in situations with salient group membership. The bottom line emerging from economic research on group decision-making is that groups are more likely to make choices that follow standard game-theoretic predictions, while individuals are more likely to be influenced by biases, cognitive limitations, and social considerations. In this sense, groups are generally less "behavioral" than individuals. An immediate implication of this result is that individual decisions in isolation cannot necessarily be assumed to be good predictors of the decisions made by groups. More broadly, the evidence casts doubts on traditional approaches that model economic behavior as if individuals were making decisions in isolation.
引用
收藏
页码:157 / 176
页数:20
相关论文
共 42 条
[1]   Information cascades: Evidence from a field experiment with financial market professionals [J].
Alevy, Jonathan E. ;
Haigh, Michael S. ;
List, John A. .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2007, 62 (01) :151-180
[2]  
[Anonymous], 4732 IZA
[3]  
[Anonymous], 504 IEW U ZUR I EMP
[4]  
[Anonymous], LETTING TEAM S UNPUB
[5]  
[Anonymous], COORDINATION C UNPUB
[6]   Individual and group decisions in the centipede game: Are groups more "rational" players? [J].
Bornstein, G ;
Kugler, T ;
Ziegelmeyer, A .
JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2004, 40 (05) :599-605
[7]  
Camerer C. F., 2011, Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction
[8]   When optimal choices feel wrong: A laboratory study of Bayesian updating, complexity, and affect [J].
Charness, G ;
Levin, D .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2005, 95 (04) :1300-1309
[9]   Individual behavior and group membership [J].
Charness, Gary ;
Rigotti, Luca ;
Rustichini, Aldo .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2007, 97 (04) :1340-1352
[10]   Individual and group decision making under risk: An experimental study of Bayesian updating and violations of first-order stochastic dominance [J].
Charness, Gary ;
Karni, Edi ;
Levin, Dan .
JOURNAL OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY, 2007, 35 (02) :129-148