From covariation to causation: A causal power theory

Because causal relations are neither observable nor deducible, they must be induced from observable events. The 2 dominant approaches to the psychology of causal induction-the covariation approach and the causal power approach-are each crippled by fundamental problems. This article proposes an integration of these approaches that overcomes these problems. The proposal is that reasoners innately treat the relation between covariation (a function defined in terms of observable events) and causal power(an unobservable entity) as that between scientists' law or model and their theory explaining the model. This solution is formalized in the power PC theory, a causal power theory of the probabilistic contrast model(P. W. Cheng & L. R. Novick, 1990). The article reviews diverse old and new empirical tests discriminating this theory from previous models, none of which is justified by a theory. The results uniquely support the power PC theory.