Mechanisms for achieving monetary stability: Inflation targeting versus the ERM

被引：19

作者：

Canzoneri, MB ^{[1
]}

Nolan, C ^{[1
]}

Yates, A ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] BANK ENGLAND,MONETARY ANAL DIV,LONDON,ENGLAND

来源：

JOURNAL OF MONEY CREDIT AND BANKING | 1997年 / 29卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2953685

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

First, we modify the Barro-Gordon model so that a credibility-stabilization trade-off will remain, even when a performance contract of the type envisaged by Walsh (1995) is imposed on the central bank governor. We do this by modeling a real interest rate bias along with the inflation bias. Then, we discuss how various inflation penalties might actually be imposed on a central bank, and ask whether ''inflation targeting'' (supported by one or another of the penalties) is likely to bring a better resolution to the credibility-stabilization trade-off than the ERM.

引用

页码：46 / 60

页数：15